Car dealer settles Lexus [Saylor Family] deaths lawsuit

...that this is costing me $$$$! It's still cheaper than fixing TOYOTAS!
Think of all the money we've saved!





Car dealer settles Lexus deaths lawsuit

Trial was set to begin this week in deaths of CHP Officer Mark Saylor and family

By Kristina Davis 11:30a.m. Mar 3, 2015

 

 

 

San Diego — A wrongful-death lawsuit against a former El Cajon Lexus dealer accused of contributing to the fiery deaths of a California Highway Patrol officer and his family settled days before trial was set to begin in Los Angeles.

Chris Lastrella, 38, who died in a bizarre high-speed car crash in Santee. He was killed alongside his sister, Cleofe Saylor, her husband, CHP Officer Mark Saylor, and the couple's 13-year-old daughter, Mahala.

The settlement between the parents of the victims and car dealer Bob Baker is the latest in a case that has received worldwide attention over unintended acceleration problems in Toyota and Lexus vehicles.

The terms of the settlement, including the amount, are confidential, and none of the parties involved would discuss the agreement.

A spokeswoman with the Los Angeles County Superior Court confirmed that the parties called the court Thursday to say that they had settled the case. Trial had been set to begin Monday.

It is the second settlement that the parents of both the officer and his wife have received in the lawsuit. In 2010 they accepted a $10 million payout from Toyota.

The Aug. 28, 2009, crash in Santee set off a ripple effect that has cost Toyota billions of dollars in settlement payouts and led to massive recalls.

The crash occurred as California Highway Patrol Officer Mark Saylor was driving the loaner Lexus ES350 from Bob Baker Lexus El Cajon with his wife, Cleofe, their daughter, 13-year-old Mahala, and his brother-in-law, Chris Lastrella.

In a 911 call as the car was barreling north on state Route 125, Lastrella reported the accelerator was stuck and brakes weren't working. The call cut off as the Lexus struck a Ford Explorer then launched into a ditch at Mission Gorge Road and erupted into flames.

An investigation pointed to a floor mat as a likely culprit. Since 2007, Toyota had known about the possibility that some floor mats, installed incorrectly, could make the accelerator stick, according to an investigation by the U.S. Justice Department. Lexus is a division of Toyota.

The lawsuit against Bob Baker Lexus alleged the dealership received warnings about such problems from Toyota but ignored them. Carpet mats that came with the Lexus ES350 were removed to keep them clean and replaced with oversized rubber mats that belong in an SUV, according to a trial brief filed by the plaintiffs.

Three days before the Saylor crash, a Bob Baker customer had returned his loaner with complaints that the floor mat had trapped the accelerator, but the dealership did nothing, the brief says.

Attorneys for Bob Baker Lexus argued that the car model was defective because it lacked clearance between the floor and pedal, lacked an override braking system and had confusing shifting and ignition button designs. Baker sold the El Cajon Lexus dealership a few years ago, telling U-T San Diego in an earlier interview that he was upset at Toyota's handling of the matter.

After the deaths, Toyota issued a flurry of recalls totaling 10 million Toyota and Lexus vehicles to fix problems with ill-fitting floor mats, sticky pedals and faulty brakes.

Toyota agreed to take a $1.1 billion charge against its earnings to cover settlements to owners who claimed to have suffered economic loss related to the recalls. The company also has settled about 200 wrongful-death and injury lawsuits.

But the Justice Department determined that wasn't enough. The government ordered the automaker last March to pay a record $1.2 billion for hiding knowledge that similar problems were present in other vehicle models, as well as failing to disclose to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration that improperly manufactured pedals were also a major threat.

From 2010 to 2012, Toyota has also paid more than $66 million in fines for delays in reporting safety problems.

Previous: Scars from crash remain raw | Toyota admits hiding defects, fined $1.B

Staff writer Karen Kucher contributed to this report.

 

 

 

http://m.utsandiego.com/news/2015/mar/03/bob-baker-saylor-settle-crash-lawsuit/

 

 

 

 

 

JUST MY OPINION...AT THE MOMENT!

...."brake override" stops runaway cars....

Video: Consumer Reports demonstrates how "brake override" stops runaway cars

Consumer Reports News: March 23, 2010 08:36 PM

As this new video demonstrates, smart throttle, or brake override, technology can be an effective tool to mitigate the risks associated with unintended acceleration. We have advocated for the adoption of smart throttle or similar technology to ensure drivers can halt their vehicles in a reasonable distance, even if the throttle is wide open. (Read: "Consumers Union calls for changes to strengthen U.S. car-safety net.") 

Our ongoing tests with our recently updatedToyota Camry and European models so-equipped from the factory continue to show the benefits of brake override systems, without interfering with normal driving needs or even grin-inducing sporty driving. (Read: " Track test: How does brake-override affect enthusiast driving?") 

Brake override is a piece of engine management software that simply lets the brakes take precedence over the throttle or accelerator if both brakes and throttle are activated at once. It's already standard on many cars, including most German imports. 

Some people assume that you can always stop a car that's speeding out of control just by hitting the brakes hard, but as you can see in the video that's not always true. And most drivers don't realize that hitting the brakes repeatedly is about the worst thing you can do during a unintended acceleration event because the power brakes in most cars are assisted by a "brake booster" that's charged by a vacuum circuit coming off the engine. An engine that's accelerating isn't producing any vacuum, and repeatedly hitting the brakes will quickly drain away the vacuum reserve, taking the power assist along with it. (Read: " How to stop a runaway car: Five steps that can save your life" and download a pdf of our advice.) 

Override's double action: Less going and more stopping 
The advantage of brake override is two-fold. By cutting power to the engine, the system slows the car, and simultaneously it lets the vacuum system recharge the power booster. Even if a driver takes several stabs on the brake, the car will progressively slow to a stop. 

Maintaining power boost through multiple brake applications is very important. We think that many drivers, faced with a growing emergency, are likely to try the brake pedal more than once before committing to a panic stop. That would be especially true on an open highway where instinct tells you to look for a place to pull over. Without brake override, that decision could be catastrophic.  

What we did 
We ran tests at our track to demonstrate what works and what doesn't if you ever need to stop a car with a stuck gas pedal. Note that despite the media attention it's gotten lately, unintended accerlation is a very rare occurrence in real life. 

For our tests and video demonstration, we used two Toyota sedans in our test fleet, the Avalon and Camry. (Learn about how we test cars.) The Avalon is scheduled for recall work that will retrofit it with brake-override technology, and the Camry has already had that work done. So these tests show how well Toyota's brake-override system works. 

Barely effective: One hard push 
Driving the Avalon down our track with the accelerator floored, our driver reached 60 mph and then pushed the brake pedal to the floor and kept it there with all the force he could muster. The Avalon finally ground to a halt, after over 500 feet. A normal stop from 60 mph would take about 140 feet. 

What not to do: Repeated braking 
Again driving the Avalon with the accelerator floored, our driver found that applying the brakes more than once essentially eliminated the power assist. Using all his weight on the brake pedal was insufficient to stop the vehicle. The best our driver could do was to keep the Avalon from accelerating faster than it was already going.

What you should do: Shift to Neutral 
If you're ever in a car that accelerates out of control, shift the gear selector to Neutral. Then brake to a stop. Even if the engine is racing there should be enough reserve vacuum power to stop the car easily. If you've depleted the vacuum you can still stop, so long as you're in Neutral and the engine isn't pulling against the brakes. 

Brake override: Less thought, better choice 
Driving our Camry with its newly retrofitted brake-override system, our driver reached 60 mph and applied the brakes while keeping the accelerator floored. The brakes immediately cut engine power, letting the car stop almost as easily as if the engine had been idling. Our driver also tried pumping the brakes a few times while slowing down, and that worked too. Each press on the brake pedal would slow the engine, which then allowed engine vacuum to recharge the brake booster. 

Brake override: a treatment, not a cure 
Brake override technology is so compelling that we think it should be standard in all cars. In our recent call forchanges to strengthen U.S. car-safety net, we recommended that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) require cars to be able to stop within a reasonable distance, even with the throttle fully open. While Toyota has pledged to make it standard on all future production starting with 2011 models, we wonder why they haven't done so earlier. 

This brake technology should reduce to near zero the problems caused by stuck or entrapped gas pedals. But it's still conceivable that some electronic glitch could override the override. And no obvious fix will help people who think they are braking when they are actually on the accelerator.    

—Gordon Hard and Jake Fisher

Be sure to follow Consumer Reports Cars blog (RSS) and Twitter (@CRcars) to keep up with the latest information and advice, also see our unintended acceleration guide.

 

 

http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2010/03/video-consumer-reports-demonstrates-how-brake-override-stops-runaway-cars/index.htm

 

 

MUST READ: Time to Close the Silver Book

MUST READ!

The article below offers the simplest explanation of flawed thinking about SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION and the flawed thinking that blames 'DRIVER ERROR.'

NHTSA is elevating DRIVER ERROR to DISTRACTED DRIVER!

The Alchemists held out great promise! What a pity they were wrong!


ANONYMOUS COMMENT:

Excellent! After listening to most of the hearing today, its obvious NHTSA will continue to be complicit! Friedman reiterated that they "took care of" the SUA problem at Toyota. I heard tons more alluding to "independent" (wink, wink) study of the airbags by NHTSA and claims IF necessary, they will expand the recall.

Takata says it doesn't know the root cause but humidity is a factor. HUH? In fact, perhaps these airbags are just aging and exploding from sheer age degradation. Shimizu and automakers kept saying that it was "older cars" having the issue. If they go down that track, it could lead to finding ALL of them degrading with time and exposure to the elements. Not comforting in the least. Takata is still using the ammonium nitrate, isn't it?

Clearly, none of us are safe on the roads any longer. I only listened to some of the Rosekind hearing but was not impressed with him. He made enough references that meshed with current NHTSA philosophy to tell me he is just another cog in the corporate wheel. I hope he proves me wrong.

Time to Close the Silver Book

Posted on Wednesday, Dec 3rd, 2014

 

For a report that’s a quarter of a century-old, testing old technology and resting on questionable assumptions, An Examination of Sudden Acceleration (also known as the Silver Book) has exerted an out-sized influence over the search for root causes in unintended acceleration events. Manufacturers have loved the document, for its emphasis on driver error as the cause of any event that cannot be readily reproduced. In the absence of any expertise, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has used it as a crutch whilst hobbling around a UA defect investigation it cannot resolve.

 

Antony Anderson, the U.K.-based electronics engineering consultant, says it’s time to consign its conclusions to the dung heap of discredited scientific lore with the likes of alchemy and spontaneous generation. His newest technical paper Intermittent Electrical Contact Resistance as a Contributory Factor in the Loss of Automobile Speed Control Functional Integrity published online by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) debunks one of The Silver Book’s central tenets, documents the real gaps the automotive industry’s fail-safe systems and makes suggestions for a course correction going forward.

 

Anderson’s observations are particularly astute in light of a rulemaking on functional safety in automotive electronics. In October, the agency published a Federal Register Notice seeking comments on the possibility of writing regulations to ensure the safety of automotive electronics. The 10-page request for comments satisfies a directive from the federal legislation known as MAP–21 to “complete an examination of the need for safety standards with regard to electronic systems in passenger motor vehicles.” Comments are due on Monday.

 

Anderson devotes a couple of sections to taking apart An Examination of Sudden Acceleration and its flawed diagnostic approach:

 

A major obstacle to the discussion of electrical intermittency in relation to SA incidents is the claim, often repeated by the automobile industry and by NHTSA, that the 1989 NHTSA Sudden Acceleration Report proves beyond all doubt that SA incidents were most probably the result of driver error. This collective mind-set appears to brook no argument and tends to kill stone-dead all reasoned discussion on the subject of electrical intermittency.

 

It’s most important and destructive assumption, he argues, has no scientific foundation, although it “remains the basis of diagnostic testing for `intermittent electronic failures' that might cause an SA to this day: ‘If the cause of an SAI is an intermittent electronic failure, physical evidence may be difficult to find, but the failure mode should be reproducible either through in-vehicle or laboratory bench tests.”

 

This assumption belies the findings of electronics experts who agree that intermittent faults are extremely difficult to find, and that their random, intermittent nature can escape the notice of a vehicle’s diagnostic system. No Fault Found in a field return is a field failure, and should be used in the quest to identify the cause. Further, “the arbitrary introduction of ‘reproducibility' by NHTSA as the proof for intermittency defines most suspected electronic intermittencies out of existence,” Anderson says.

 

Any Sudden Acceleration Incident that cannot be replicated leads to the “inescapable” conclusion that the event was the result of driver error. In the driver-error scenario, the Silver Book posits that some vehicle malfunction causes the engine to surge, startling the driver and causing him to depress the accelerator on the mistaken belief that it is the brake. Here, Anderson observes that the root cause is actually the malfunction that caused the driver to startle in the first place and that two of the hypothetical culprits – an idle stabilizer malfunction or a cruise control malfunction – were intermittent electronic malfunctions. (In the case of Unintended Accelerations in Audi, which prompted the report in the first place: Between 1982 and 1987, Audi issued six recalls to address Sudden Unintended Acceleration in its vehicles. Three of them replaced worn idle stabilizer units.)

Anderson then sets about challenging that premise by using a reed relay to simulate a mechanically-induced electrical intermittency either as an open circuit or a short circuit. His experiments show that intermittent speed sensor connections can generate false speed signals that overcome the vehicle’s low speed inhibit logic. For example, a single mechanically-induced intermittency in one of the speed sensor connections or on the microcontroller PCB, plus a signal to tell the cruise control to engage makes it possible for the system to take over speed control from the driver.

 

And, because vehicles with electronic throttle controls are not fitted with an independent failsafe system, the driver “becomes the fail-safe for any potential malfunction of the electronic throttle,” Anderson writes. “The automobile industry is unique in this respect – in any other industry loss of speed control would be protected against and, as a last resort, there would be an emergency stop button.”

 

He scoffs at electronic brake over-ride systems, software patches that run on the same hardware as the electronic throttle – they wouldn’t work in a software malfunction, and therefore are only a “partial fail safe against pressing the accelerator at the same time as the brake.”

 

Instead, Anderson makes several suggestions for dealing with unintended accelerations: restricting the fuel supply to the engine the moment that an un-commanded wide open throttle condition is detected; suppression of half or a lower fraction of the ignition pulses to reduce engine power; opening a bypass valve in the hydraulic torque converter to reduce the transmitted power.

 

Anderson’s false speed signal experiments joins other research studies that show how a vehicle can go to an uncommanded wide-open throttle, with no fault found. Southern Illinois University Automotive electronics Professor David Gilbert showed that a short in the accelerator pedal position sensor could cause a wide-open throttle. Scientists from NASA’s Engineering Safety Center demonstrated tin whiskers could cause a UA with no trouble code set and embedded systems expert Michael Barr found a mountain of software errors could lead to vehicle malfunctions, including a UA, unbeknownst to the diagnostic system.

 

We can only hope that eventually, these more empirically based efforts will overcome the Silver Book’s unfathomable momentum.

 

 

 

http://www.safetyresearch.net/blog/articles/time-close-silver-book