TOYOTA'S own documents indicate that TOYOTA knew that the SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION PROBLEM was caused by software.
SEE: TOYOTA'S CORPORATE HANDBOOK: Chapter 1: LIE
TOYOTA'S subsequent DOJ settlement for $1.2 BILLION for LYING, MISLEADING THE PUBLIC and so on....not for SOFTWARE.
There is no indication in the DOJ Settlement that TOYOTA would correct the defective vehicles still on our roads.
HERE'S THE DOJ INFORMATION
The $1.2 BILLION TOYOTA SETTLEMENT was preceeded by the lengthy trial in Oklahoma that TOYOTA LOST!
Not only was TOYOTA unable to explain the SKID MARKS left by the TOYOTA in the driver's efforts to stop her RUNAWAY TOYOTA, but her passenger called her husband prior to her death and told him that the TOYOTA WOULDN'T STOP.
Toyota's killer firmware: Bad design and its consequences
Michael Dunn -October 28, 2013
On Thursday October 24, 2013, an Oklahoma court ruled against Toyota in a case of unintended acceleration that lead to the death of one the occupants. Central to the trial was the Engine Control Module's (ECM) firmware.
Embedded software used to be low-level code we'd bang together using C or assembler. These days, even a relatively straightforward, albeit critical, task like throttle control is likely to use a sophisticated RTOS and tens of thousands of lines of code.
With all this sophistication, standards and practices for design, coding, and testing become paramount – especially when the function involved is safety-critical. Failure is not an option. It is something to be contained and benign.
So what happens when an automaker decides to wing it and play by their own rules? To disregard the rigorous standards, best practices, and checks and balances required of such software (and hardware) design? People are killed, reputations ruined, and billions of dollars are paid out. That's what happens. Here's the story of some software that arguably never should have been.
| Check out this related EE Live! 2014 session:Killer Apps: Embedded Software's Greatest Hit Jobs |
Barr's ultimate conclusions were that:
- Toyota’s electronic throttle control system (ETCS) source code is of unreasonable quality.
- Toyota’s source code is defective and contains bugs, including bugs that can cause unintended acceleration (UA).
- Code-quality metrics predict presence of additional bugs.
- Toyota’s fail safes are defective and inadequate (referring to them as a “house of cards” safety architecture).
- Misbehaviors of Toyota’s ETCS are a cause of UA.
A damning summary to say the least. Let's look at what lead him to these conclusions:
Hardware
Although the investigation focused almost entirely on software, there is at least one HW factor:
Toyota claimed the 2005 Camry's main CPU had error detecting and correcting (EDAC) RAM. It didn't. EDAC, or at least parity RAM, is relatively easy and low-cost insurance for safety-critical systems.
Other cases of throttle malfunction have been linked to tin whiskers in the accelerator pedal sensor. This does not seem to have been the case here.
The Camry ECM board. U2 is a NEC (now Renesas) V850 microcontroller.
Software
The ECM software formed the core of the technical investigation. What follows is a list of the key findings.
Mirroring (where key data is written to redundant variables) was not always done. This gains extra significance in light of …
Stack overflow.
Toyota claimed only 41% of the allocated stack space was being used. Barr's investigation showed that 94% was closer to the truth. On top of that, stack-killing, MISRA-C rule-violating recursion was found in the code, and the CPU doesn't incorporate memory protection to guard against stack overflow.
Two key items were not mirrored: The RTOS' critical internal data structures; and—the most important bytes of all, the final result of all this firmware—the TargetThrottleAngle global variable.
Although Toyota had performed a stack analysis, Barr concluded the automaker had completely botched it. Toyota missed some of the calls made via pointer, missed stack usage by library and assembly functions (about 350 in total), and missed RTOS use during task switching. They also failed to perform run-time stack monitoring.
Toyota's ETCS used a version of OSEK, which is an automotive standard RTOS API. For some reason, though, the CPU vendor-supplied version was not certified compliant.
Unintentional RTOS task shutdown was heavily investigated as a potential source of the UA. As single bits in memory control each task, corruption due to HW or SW faults will suspend needed tasks or start unwanted ones. Vehicle tests confirmed that one particular dead task would result in loss of throttle control, and that the driver might have to fully remove their foot from the brake during an unintended acceleration event before being able to end the unwanted acceleration.
A litany of other faults were found in the code, including buffer overflow, unsafe casting, and race conditions between tasks.
http://www.edn.com/design/automotive/4423428/Toyota-s-killer-firmware--Bad-design-and-its-consequences
